I saw this tweet hours after finishing Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian, one of the greatest books I’ve ever read. For fun, I decided to riff on this from an international relations POV.

All views and expressions are personal, mine and mine alone.

The analyst looked up from his blotted compounded notes and sickly ink with his weathered eyes and bruised ideas and confounded heretic fingers.

How could this be possible he asked.

In fact is the question not to be asked as to why it has taken this long to understand the innate place this outcome has always had for Cain and man the judge smiled. He pulled his grotesque pale frame closer to the analyst.

The analyst squirmed and his stomach stabbed for buried deeply under twenty years of being told this could not be possible by learned men who had learned their rules when the world was walked by other types of men who had learned their rules from a time when men walked with intention and sin. He squinted and spat.

We have rules and agreements and we have decided that we ain’t going to live in a world of violence and chaos where the strong rule and the weak suffer and that this world would have proper systems set up to make sure every man could have their protection owed to them by fellow men. We have agreed on this, we have. These are the rules for which all of us in power gathered to agree on.

Did we spoke the judge. I certainly do not remember signing any such covenant for how the world was or shall be and beyond that I have seen that most men likewise did not for the world is divided between those who believe this to be the case and those who understand that violence is elemental a heat through which man is moulded and societies created and kingdoms destroyed. The meek do not inherit and never have. Your covenant world is a maze in which only you and your kind chose to enter without knowing and believe all men walk with you.

Closing 2025 view on British foreign policy and strategy

Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “to understand the man, you have to know what was happening in the world when he was twenty.”

The average British politician is around 50 years old, so let us ask - what did the world look like for them in 1995?

Why are we in this predicament? Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “to understand the man you have to know what was happening in the world when he was twenty.” The average British politician is around 50 years old, so let us ask - what did the world look like for them in 1995?

In this unipolar landscape dominated by Pax Americana, Britain was home to around 58 million people, with net inflows in the low tens of thousands a year and social cohesion mirroring these numbers. Its economy was larger than India and China’s combined, with Shell and BP leading the FTSE100. Defence stood at 3% of GDP, health spending somewhere between 6 and 7%. Culture was fixated on Cool Britannia and the Battle of Britpop between Blur and Oasis; England would host the Euros the following year. An American company called Microsoft had just launched Windows 95, heralding the tentative arrival of the internet and online worlds for our 20 year old, who may have also just nabbed themselves a new Japanese gaming device called the Playstation for Christmas that year.

Arriving for drinks at a pub in Westminster, our one-day MP may have paused Michael Jackson’s Earth Song on their Walkman, walked through the door, and begun discussing the inevitable Labour victory on the horizon under up and coming leader Tony Blair. Moving the conversation beyond the Channel - where a tunnel had just been completed between the UK and France - our intrepid politico may have ruminated over a second £1.50 beer that while it was indeed a complex world, it was one in which a sense of liberal progress was being made, evidenced most strongly by the end of apartheid in South Africa and the post-Soviet transitions of many nations into new multiparty systems. So while the end of history it was not, it would have been hard to feel anything other than a glowing sense of optimism for liberal democracies around the world. The 21st century, the group would have agreed, was shaping up to be a good one.

Times change, even if mindsets don’t. Very few statesmen recognise this reality, yet the minority of the best do. In a 2018 interview with The Financial Times, the late Henry Kissinger observed: “I think Trump may be one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretences.” Too many in the Westminster village are products of an era that has passed, and are destroying this country’s ability to reform by holding on to old pretences of grandeur. The reelection of President Donald Trump is a feature, not a bug, of a new era. We now live in an epoch of protectionism, nationalism, transactionalism, scientific acceleration towards artificial general intelligence, and energy autonomy. It is a return to the great man theory of political history and a fundamental restructuring of the liberal order which existed from the end of the Cold War until the Global Financial Crisis in 2008.

More practically, our political class has failed to capitalise on the chaos of the world and to protect key industries. Instead, like grotesque characters from a Hogarth illustration of a courtly dinner, they have clambered over each other to try and impose ideas the wider public neither agrees with nor voted for, but that are popular at commentariat dinner parties or among their peers.

Dull, low rumbling chaos and panicked apathy envelop Westminster. These are manifested in the constant churn of new prime ministers, ministers, and officials, each with their own ideas, failings and ambitions. It is evidenced by the lack of action, the inability to build, and the gross sectarianism that is beginning to creep into this nation. The UK’s pathetic economy, where key elements needed to underpin successful foreign policy live and die - energy security, military strength, cutting edge innovation - have been stifled, ignored, or sold off to the highest bidder.

Eras change. This new era demands a more pragmatic, dexterous and focused approach. It requires a leader with a holistic overarching vision who understands the foundations of what will make British foreign policy successful. This leader should reach into Britain’s history to understand what enabled its rise - science, naval power, trading influence - but this must be coupled with a hard-nosed approach to securing the spaces that will define the next century - artificial intelligence, quantum, compute, and - quite literally - space. British foreign policy must be interlinked with the health of the economy, clear investment in the science sector, the public’s attitude towards immigration, and a general feeling that life is improving for British citizens. These latter points are vital to understand: strength abroad must be built on social cohesion and strength at home.

Yet Britain has faced more existential challenges than this. This small island battled for a place on the international stage, kicking and screaming and fighting against some of the most brilliant leaders and empires of their time. We created global corporations that moulded humanity around them. Our ideas underpin nations on every single continent on this earth. We have previously cemented ourselves as a democracy of real influence, a powerful purveyor of free trade and customs, a place where capitalists can trade and grow wealthy. And Britain continues to produce some of the finest innovators, scientists and thinkers on this planet.

Hello,

I was recently invited to deliver a speech for the Wilberforce Society at Cambridge University. The topic was threefold over the course of an hour and a half: US-China-UK relations, my career, and then a final 30 minute Q&A segment. It was also my 30th birthday.

What follows is a transcript of two parts of the speech: US-China-UK relations, and my career. I framed parts of the former on 1776, and the latter on lessons from my own career to date. I’ve removed about half for the sake of brevity and making the content more relevant to a general audience.

TRANSCRIPT - CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Wilberforce Society - 19 November 2025 speech

It’s an honour to be here this evening to speak to all of you. […] kindly let me know I should split the next hour and a half into three 30 minute segments:

1. The first covers the US-China technology relationship and where Britain sits between them - some observations, the smartest of which are borrowed from my excellent colleagues.

2. The second will cover my own career - an unorthodox but not uninteresting dance through gonzo journalism, entrepreneurship, politics, policy, strategy, and many mistakes.

3. And that will leave the final 30 minutes for audience questions.

It’s also my 30th birthday today, so that rounds out a good even run of 30s. Thank you for all being here to involuntarily celebrate it with me.

China in perspective

I think it’s always a useful exercise to try and contextualise today through the lens of yesterday.

So let us journey back to 1776, when your think tank’s namesake, William Wilberforce, was a student at St John’s College here in Cambridge.

What did the world look like when he walked the same halls you walk? Let us join Mr Wilberforce as he skims his copy of the papers at breakfast one November morning.

On the front page, plenty of coverage about the ongoing war against this so-called upstart outpost to the West, America. 13 colonies have declared independence during the summer, and the British empire is in the midst of trying to crush this independence uprising across the Atlantic. Further down the table, we can imagine some of his fellow students are discussing if the dastardly French may enter the war on the American side.

Turning the page, he reads of whispers spreading from Eastern Europe of an emerging power. Catherine the Great’s Russia is looking to capitalize financially on the ongoing chaos and consolidate gains made against the Ottoman Empire in earlier wars on the fringes of Europe.

Scanning his eyes eastwards across the two page spread, Mr Wilberforce’s attention comes across news of another empire, of which huge amounts are seemingly unknown. Previously called Cathay, this almost mythical kingdom is now referred to as China by Western diplomats and intellectuals.

It’s ruled by the Qing dynasty and straddles vast parts of Asia; yet this empire remains difficult to understand or access for outsiders; trade is tightly controlled, most diplomats do not share a common language with their Chinese counterparts, and mythical stories of its size return home on the lips of merchants to hungry audiences in coffee houses across Europe.

Having had his fill of geopolitical turbulence, our protagonist flicks to the business section of his paper. There sits a long review of a new book causing waves among Europe’s intellectual elite, a piece of work called Wealth of Nations by a Scottish economist called Adam Smith. Scanning down the page, he sees adverts for machines using a marvellous new technology called steam power, which has begun to be used in mines and mills around England.

In short: this was a world in flux, in a battle between the old and new, with competing ideas, technology, and philosophies swirling around at breakneck speeds.

In many ways the world we live in is not dissimilar to that of your namesake. Two powers now effectively compete - the United States, and China - on multiple fronts and across multiple arenas. It’s the latter we will now focus on.

I want to highlight three key framing points:

1. China is at the forefront of many technologies, matching the US on some and ahead on others. It is not simply ‘stealing IP’ in the way it has previously been accused of doing and viewing this as the source of its current success will lead to poor strategy.

2. China is not going away, and will cut across almost every issue you end up working on, be that law, finance, trade or diplomacy.

3. China is not a homogenous blob; nor is the United States, or any other country. Every country behaves according to its own autonomous logic. This is an obvious observation but you would be surprised by how often smart people look past it.

So let us discuss China. China’s speed of technological development is astounding, even, or especially, if you take the view that many of its blunders in the last half-century were self-inflicted and appalling.

Consider these figures: In 1990, China’s GDP was roughly $360 billion. By 2024, it exceeded $18 trillion.

In 1995, when I was born, Britain’s economy was larger than India’s and China’s combined. Today, China’s economy is roughly five times the size of Britain’s.

But the raw numbers only tell part of the story. Shenzhen offers a dramatic example: in 1980, it was a tiny fishing village with a population of 30,000. By 2024, that figure had grown to over 17.5 million. This is a city that compressed centuries of urban evolution into four decades, a transformation that took London nearly two millennia to achieve. Its GDP exploded from 270 million yuan in 1980 to 3.68 trillion yuan in 2024, an increase of more than 10,000 times. When I was living in Hong Kong, you could nip over to Shenzhen to buy knock off suits and cheap electronics. It now counts Huawei, Tencent and DJI as headquartered residents.

…

This brings me to why I’ve structured this talk around 1776. Wilberforce, as a young man at Cambridge, was entering a world where the certainties of the previous century were crumbling. The American Revolution challenged assumptions about empire and hegemony. The Industrial Revolution challenged assumptions about economics. The Enlightenment challenged assumptions about knowledge and authority.

You are in a similar position. The technological and geopolitical certainties of the post-Cold War era and the Cool Britannia 90s: American technological dominance, the inevitability of globalisation, the assumed superiority of open systems: are all being challenged. China’s technological rise is a reality not to be corrected but to be navigated.

…[Long analysis on Chinese vs US technology landscape]…

Part II: An Unorthodox Career (30 minutes)

Let me move on to my own career, and hopefully discuss different episodes which may prove useful for you. Hopefully a broad theme emerges, which is this: it is not failure until you allow it to be. I’ll frame this unorthodox journey around three key lessons I’ve learned from much smarter people than myself in the process.

I was born in 1995, in a smallish city called Christchurch on the South Island of New Zealand. As I noted earlier, when I was born 30 years ago today, Britain’s economy was larger than India’s and China’s combined, to give you a reference for how rapidly our world has changed. I’ve moved a fair bit: from New Zealand to Australia, then to Hong Kong, up to Scotland, then Leeds, and finally London.

In all these places I’ve existed on the peripheries of cultures, groups and societies. The ability to look in from the outside has proven incredibly helpful in my career and life so far. Being an outsider can give you a helpful edge, if you combine the looking in with respect and objectivity.

After university, I moved to London with dreams of working for a strategic advisory company. In my mind: boozy lunches, pinstriped suits, chatting about politics, sort of like the Wolf of Westminster. In reality, I spent a year freelancing, applied to roughly 300 jobs, and wrote some user manuals for a tattoo removal company. I couldn’t understand why I wasn’t able to land a job I genuinely wanted.

Herein lies the first lesson.

Sometimes you have to work back from what you want to find a path towards the finish line.

This is what the late, great Charlie Munger called inversion.

I knew I wanted to work with people who advised leaders. So how could I get in front of them? One consistent thing about powerful people is that they can buy everything in the world, except one thing: time. So if you can find ways to save them time, by delivering them high quality information succinctly for example, they value that immensely.

So I launched a newsletter called The Distiller. The idea was simple: by 7AM every weekday, you would have an email with all of Britain’s front pages in your inbox, a little blurb on the main story, the circulation figures, and political leaning of each paper. I woke up at 5AM to wrote it every day for about a year.

…

[My bosses] taught me my second critical lesson:

Truth, poorly explained, is a lie. This means that it doesn’t matter if you have the best paper, report, idea or concept: if you can’t explain it, it almost doesn’t matter. Communicating your insights clearly is a raw advantage and talent that will benefit you professionally and personally.

Fast forward a year or two. In 2019, the Hong Kong protests kicked off. Watching from London, I wanted to pivot into helping form Britain’s approach to China, and so in 2020, I referred back to my first lesson: work back from what you want.

I founded Beijing to Britain. The premise was simple: the UK-China bilateral relationship was becoming increasingly important, but the quality of publicly available analysis was inadequate. Too much was either academic and inaccessible, or largely superficial and over emotional. There was a gap for something in between: intelligence-level analysis delivered in a format that busy people could actually use.

…

Working in Parliament taught me the gap between analysis and action. You can produce the most brilliant paper on Chinese supply chain vulnerabilities, but if you can’t translate that into legislative language, into political arguments that resonate with colleagues, into soundbites that communicate the issue to the public, then it doesn’t matter. It is that simple.

If you cannot communicate and action effectively, none of it matters. Policy work requires you to be multilingual in this sense: fluent in the analytical language of research, the procedural language of Parliament, and the emotional language of politics. By the way, technology policy requires the same skill set.

I left Parliament in 2022 to turn Beijing to Britain into a commercial entity. What started out as an anonymous Substack became weekly briefings that were read by FTSE100 companies, government departments, Parliament, and Whitehall. At its peak, my analysis reached over a million views across 140 countries. I briefed politicians, embassy teams, and boardrooms. During this period, the British Parliament published my analysis on strategic thinking and Chinese capabilities. Most importantly, I got a chance to speak with hundreds of smart people trying their absolute best to understand and work in this complex bilateral relationship.

Herein lies the third important lesson from my career:

You don’t have to be the smartest person in the room - and you probably won’t be. But you should make yourself someone smart people want to work with, and eventually for, as it will make your life more full and more interesting.

…

My career hasn’t followed a traditional trajectory. I didn’t go into the Foreign Office — in fact, I was rejected twice —, or into academia, or into a consultancy to stay and work my way up.

Instead, I’ve moved between advisory, entrepreneurship, Parliament, and policy. The consistent path through my life has been the study of power: of how countries, leaders, and companies use it. What incentives govern them, how they exploit their systems, how others respond, how you can advise them.

The advantage of this path, I think, is that you see how different worlds operate. I can begin to understand how businesses think about China risk because I’ve briefed CEOs and board members. I can begin to understand how Parliament works because I’ve been in the room when amendments are drafted, those speeches penned. I understand media dynamics because I’ve been interviewed by journalists, given them off record briefings, and monitored how stories evolve professionally. And all of these careers have taught me how little I know about almost everything.

Each of these worlds has its own logic, its own incentives, its own language. The skill isn’t mastering one, but instead being able to move between them, to translate insights from one domain into action in another. That’s increasingly what the China and AI challenge requires: people who can bridge the gap between technology, policy, business, and security.

…

Many of you are deciding what to do after Cambridge. Some will take traditional paths, others won’t. Let me repeat those three key observations:

1. First: work back from the end point. What does your finish line look like? How can you use incentive structures to get there?

2. Second: learn to communicate clearly, especially when you come from academia. Life is complex, humans are complex - everyone has a million things going on at once. Clear, meaningful and deliberate communication is a rare talent, and will make a profound difference to your career and life.

3. Third: you won’t always be the smartest person in the room. That’s absolutely fine. You should be comfortable with that, and with working with, for, and eventually above, people who are smarter than you. It will lead to a deeply satisfying life.

Finally, career paths are not linear, and that’s fine. I’m 30 today. By conventional standards, I should be mid-career in one organization, building toward a senior role. Instead, I’ve founded a company, worked in Parliament, advised businesses, and now work in policy research. I’ve also had so many deeply gruelling rejections and interview processes that have ended in nothing that I have lost count.

…

You just have to pick yourself up. Failure is only failure when you don’t learn something from it, and if you view it as an end point.

So the question then, I suggest, isn’t whether your path is orthodox. It is whether it’s genuine.

Does it reflect honest engagement with problems that matter, rather than strategic positioning for the next line on your CV?

Does it reflect your outlook on life, the things that drive you, that you dug deep into to win your place at this historical establishment?

And will you have the drive to move forward from potential hardship and failure to craft your own journey?

When Wilberforce sat in these halls three centuries ago, it was not clear to him or his peers what the next 100 years would look like. What Britain’s role would be. What society was getting wrong. What powers were rising and which were falling. But Wilberforce faced those uncertainties head on, and made an historical and profoundly good difference. So my question is - will you?

Hello,

Spend time reading the biographies of, or speeches by, leading statesmen over the last four centuries and a consistent theme emerges: almost all of them spent large parts of their lives digesting, translating, or discussing classic texts or art. Cicero, Thucydides, Shakespeare, Plato, Plutarch (particularly ‘Lives’, which appears over and over), Tacitus and many others appear on bookshelves or cited in key strategic speeches. It becomes clear that through the passage of time, truly great leaders have sought to contextualise their moment in power through the prism of those who have gone before them, who themselves had often lived through intense moments of political, societal or economic turbulence and upheaval. I suspect the works provided almost something spiritual to underpin a leader’s own time in power: a sense of understanding that the human spirit coalesces around certain concepts or ideas, and can be woven and directed by those who appreciate this reality. Perhaps they sought inspiration, education - even comfort, from these texts.

I write this note partly because I recently re-read James Marriott’s excellent, scathing and frankly depressing essay on the dawn of a post-literate society. This spurred me to delve into how (in)frequently classic thinkers are referenced in contemporary British political speeches - more on that at the end of this note.

In Britain, Boris Johnson is probably the last Prime Minister who would claim to be a classicist and took pleasure in quoting from the annals. Perhaps a cynic would offer that this was also participating in a form of elite signalling, demonstrating membership in an exclusive educated class, and that we should be careful not to assume that classical references always equaled deep wisdom or better governance. Perhaps. But it made me wonder: how many of Britain’s leading politicians would today turn to the classics to find inspiration, answers or comfort to their many complex problems?

Too few I suspect. This is a shame for them, and damaging for us as a democracy.

To be uninterested in history as a statesman is, at minimum, to miss an opportunity. It suggests you think you’re the first person to experience the situations you find yourself in, that you alone can produce novel answers, that humans before you haven’t wrestled with similar dilemmas. In democracies, it evidences a lack of curiosity in the systems you operate within, built as they were by statesmen from previous epochs from where these writings emerged. This might be arrogance, or it might simply reflect the realities of modern governance: who has time for Tacitus when there are Select Committee deadlines, for Plutarch when there are briefings to give to client journalists?

Still, taking the time to (re)read classic texts allows you to spar with the author’s key ideas: how could I apply this to my moment? Do I agree with this framing? Have the core foundations of democracy changed to such an extent in the last two thousand years that these ideas are no longer relevant?

—

A conversation with the past

Thucydides

Thucydides speaks to the art of great power competition and the follies of hegemonic greed. Described as “a humourless man, pessimistic, sceptical, highly intelligent, cold and reserved” in one famous introductory note, the former Athenian general’s framing of the conflict between Athens and Sparta, the expansion and collapse of the League, and the speech of Pericles are all keystones in any great leader’s repertoire and are studied by militaries around the world to this day. In my view, the Melian Dialogue and The Mytilenean Debate remain two of the most consequential passages in the text. Winston Churchill cited the Athenian general on numerous occasions, including a deep discussion with then Prime Minister H.H. Asquith, and Henry Kissinger read his works closely.

Cicero

A study of Cicero allows a politician to observe the consequences of an establishment’s creeping intellectual cowardice in the face of proto-Machiavellian manoeuvring, among other themes of note. The dying Republic’s most famous orator witnessed the decay of his world through weary, depressed eyes. De Officiis, written in his final years, sought to spell out, via the format of letters to his son, Cicero’s views on what makes a moral and integral leader. Frederick II “the Great” of Prussia called it “the best work on morals that has been or can be written,” and it played a formative role in the framework of the American legal system and the in shaping the minds of its architects.

Shakespeare

Some leaders sought to understand the extremities of their power through literature or poetry that speaks to the human spirit.1 Unsurprisingly, William Shakespeare is a favourite. Abraham Lincoln quoted from Macbeth and wrote to one of his favourite actors, James H. Hackett:

“Some of Shakespeare’s plays I have never read, while others I have gone over perhaps as frequently as any unprofessional reader. Among the latter are Lear, Richard Third, Henry Eighth, Hamlet, and especially Macbeth.

I think nothing equals Macbeth—It is wonderful.”

The Silence in Hansard

Given how many British politicians and civil servants enter Parliament via the Oxford/Cambridge PPE pipeline, it is likely that a number of the governing elite have read these texts at some point during their studies. Of course, engagement with ideas doesn’t always manifest as explicit citation; one can be shaped by Juvenal or Aristophanes without name-dropping them. Still, parliamentary mentions offer at least one measurable indicator of whether these works remain part of political discourse.

Prior to examining the data, my guess is that we would have seen upticks around wider geopolitical events: for example, an increase in Thucydides citations during the Cold War, reflecting the tension and struggle between two world powers. Or perhaps during Brexit debates, we may have seen politicians cite some of Cicero’s thinking around how you structure legal systems, and so on.

Skimming through Hansard, it is notable how infrequently British politicians directly mention classic thinkers in their speeches over the last century. For example, the chart below shows mentions of ‘Thucydides’ between 1 January 1925 to this week. The peak - 5 mentions - occurred during a debate on 9 July 2003 on the draft EU Constitutional Treaty, and only then because a quote from the Athenian had been included in a previous text. A smattering of other mentions include a 1938 debate on the death penalty, where James Barr MP quoted several classical texts and the aforementioned section from Thucydides on punishment, and more recent nods by Lord Alderdice to the so-called Thucydides Trap vis-à-vis the US and China.

Cicero likewise finds himself fairly under-quoted in Parliament. The major spike occurred in 2018 mostly due to a debate on a Finance Bill which saw MPs go back and forth about their favourite quote of his. Another spike occurred around 1948 during a debate on British nationality, wherein MPs argued as to whether the phrase “civis Romanus sum” (“I am a Roman citizen”) was penned by Cicero or Saul of Tarsus (St Paul).

Closing views

Does classical literacy actually produce better governance? This is almost impossible to measure. Churchill read Thucydides and led Britain through its finest hour, but he also engineered the Gallipoli disaster. Boris Johnson quoted Cicero whilst having multiple affairs and behaving in a way the Roman giant would have found appalling. The correlation between classical education and political wisdom is, at best, murky. Too many variables, too much contingency, too much that depends on character, circumstance, and luck.

And yet. Even granting all this complexity, one can’t help but feel that something has been lost. Not certainty about better outcomes, but perhaps a certain depth of historical perspective, a lexicon for discussing power and its limits, a shared cultural reference point that once united political elites - a concept Kissinger touched on in a different context in a 1969 essay:

Perhaps the real issue isn’t whether politicians quote classical thinkers, but whether they engage in rigorous historical thinking at all. Do they study how previous societies handled crises? Do they learn from policy failures? Do they think in decades rather than election cycles?

The honest answer is: I don’t know for certain. My unprovable gut feeling is that many of the current crop of politicians in Britain’s political system would struggle to hold up against their predecessors a century ago if asked to explain classical texts and key strategic concepts within them. If so, that is a shame: for us, for them, and for our democracy.

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Hello,

This post is data heavy. It collates points that will be of use and interest to you if you work around foreign policy, international trade, commodities, defence, finance, or anything that involves having a novel view on themes that underpin our world.

I have used the original report frequently over the past year as a source of stimulation and a means of stress testing ideas I’ve come up with. As you’ll see, I’ve often added my own notes, compounding analysis, or graphs and tables on many points. These tend to come from digging further into footnotes contained in the original report, and then seeing if more recent data was avaliable and gathering information from other, non-linked PDFs or analyses.

If this gets a strong reception, I will share a second memo which examines some of the thematic drivers that underpin some of my own 2055 projections.

I hope you enjoy it - let me know your views.

Sam

—

In September 2024, Britain’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) published a 450 page document setting out its view on what the world may look like in 2055. The Global Strategic Trends report is the seventh effort of its type, and a year on remains a truly valuable piece of work, packed with statistics, analysis, and projections that are hard to find compiled elsewhere.

It was produced by MoD's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), which functions as its in-house think tank, and aims to provide long‑term strategic context for decision-makers. To this end, it is explicit: “outputs of this programme are based on the premise that predicting the future is impossible. This publication therefore offers analysis, based on a range of strategic foresight tools, to help users minimise bias and reduce the likelihood of surprise or unwanted outcomes, while building preparedness and agility to meet alternative futures.”

The report also covers thematic issues such as society, economy, conflict and security, and additional ‘shared spaces’ such as the Arctic, Antarctic, oceans and space. I may cover these in a separate note if this one proves of interest.

Despite its excellent content, my impression is that it was largely ignored by Westminster and beyond.

DATA POINTS OF NOTE

What follows then is a hybrid: the backbone of this note is me pulling my favourite statistics, facts and themes almost directly from DCDC’s report, geographically split, along with many of the graphics and tables. If the chart or graph comes from a different source, I’ve labelled it. If there’s no label, it comes from the MoD report.

Building on that backbone of information, I’m adding in my own analysis and Marginal Takes, which include information not covered in the original report. My own research, views and analysis are noted in bold. Anything not in bold is from DCDC’s report and quoted almost always word for word.

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East and South Asia

• It is estimated that 88% of the next billion people to attain middle class status will reside in Asia, with the majority being in China and India. This stat comes from a 2017 Brookings report, which defines “middle class” as people spending $11–$110 per person per day in 2011 PPP (purchasing power parity). In the Chinese and Indian context, this raises several interesting questions: will this middle class be able to successfully convert its growth to pressure up the way? How many of these people will live in tier two and three cities? How will those cities change to accommodate their arrivals? Many of these new middle class entrants will be Indian rather than Chinese, and will hover around the $11 mark, I suspect.

• Of the top ten global military powers, five – China, India, South Korea, Japan and Pakistan – are in East and South Asia. Note the obvious point, that a number of these countries share borders with each other

• Approximately 15% of Indians are adherents to Islam. This relatively small percentage of the country’s population still represents more than 200 million people, and is the second largest Muslim community in the world

• India is projected to peak at 1.69 billion people around 2055.

• The share of Chinese and Indian 25–34 year old tertiary graduates is projected to increase from 31% of the global pool in 2013 to 50% by 2030; the US share almost halves in the same period.

• Bangladesh will remain one of the world’s most densely populated countries. 1,301 people per km² as of a 2022 World Bank estimate.

• By 2030, 60% of global STEM graduates will be the product of China and India’s education systems, with the US and Europe graduating only 4% and 8% respectively

• On climate change, if emission levels remain high, it is estimated that South Asia could see between 35.7 to 63 million climate migrants, equivalent to 1.6% of the population, by the middle of the century

• Rainfall patterns in China have altered drastically in the last few decades, causing large increases in flooding; the resulting economic damage is currently estimated at US $25.3 billion a year, with projections that it could reach US $389 billion a year in the next two decades

• Several of the region’s major financial centres, including Hong Kong, Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei, are at risk from sea level rise

• The Maldives are almost totally dependent on non-renewable sources or converting non-potable water sources

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Southeast Asia and Oceania

• A third of regional states are small, dispersed islands with populations under 150,000 and only a third of states have a population over 1 million, making them some of the smallest countries in the world

• As interest in the Antarctic region increases further, the ‘gateway cities’ of Hobart (Australia) and Christchurch (New Zealand) may see their geostrategic importance rise, and they could attract growing attention from external actors looking to gain access to Antarctic resources. Tasmania launched a new Antarctic campaign to maximise its "significant economic potential as the gateway to the southern-most continent" as part of the government's 2030 Strong Plan for Tasmania's Future.

• Papua New Guinea’s urban population is projected to increase by over 70% by 2055 alongside a general population boom, with Cambodia and Myanmar facing similar challenges. Interestingly, the Tony Blair Institute is prospecting setting up shop in PNG.

• Out to 2055, the region’s Muslim population is likely to grow due to high birth rates in Indonesia and to a lesser extent Malaysia and Brunei. We have yet to see how a growth in Muslim populations intersects with artificial intelligence, perhaps because so much of the work being done on this is in the United States and China. I note this because it seems likely that in the coming years, some Muslim-led countries will seek to create a GPT inspired by values from their faith, which has begun to be called for in places such as the UAE’s national paper. The author writes “There needs to be an AI Fatwa Council – a multidisciplinary body of scholars, technologists and ethicists that can provide authoritative guidance on how to govern, apply and develop artificial intelligence in accordance with Islamic values. This is not to limit innovation but to accelerate it responsibly.” In my view, civilisational religious approaches to developing this technology seem under-scrutinised and explored.

• This is a region acutely at risk of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This will likely increase as a source of conflict as water temperatures change and fishing stock migrate with new patterns. IUU remains one of the most overlooked triggers of conflict in the coming decades, a repeated point you will see alluded to in the DCDC note and this memo.

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Russia

• Russia is expected to witness a decline in its population from 140 million in 2023 to 130 million in 2055, with some predicting an even steeper fall to 125 million

• Before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it was second only to the US in its ability to attract migrants

• The drive for self-sufficiency in pharmaceuticals since 2013 has boosted domestic manufacturing and supply; by 2017, over 80% of drugs sold in Russia were domestically produced. This stat caught my eye and I was sceptical, plus its corresponding footnote linked to an article on automotives, not medicine. Some brief digging finds that Russia did not become “80% self-sufficient” overall by 2017 in such black and white terms. Russia increased the number of packs made locally, but that is not the same as making the high-value parts or the core ingredients, which it still has to rely on from external markets (80% of its active ingredients are sourced from abroad, primarily China and India). Regardless, I had a dig into Russia’s “Pharma 2020/2030” strategies because I was curious as to how it had achieved this outcome [something we should be thinking about more in the UK, given our own chokepoints in the supply chain in India and China]

• Russia is the sole proprietor of nuclear icebreakers. I had a dig into this to see why. In short, it appears to be for three main reasons. First, Russia needs all year access and manoeuvrability in the High North, and nuclear provides that. Second, there are many difficulties with bringing a nuclear icebreaker into ports - insurance, local resentment and fear, and so on - that have incentivised other nations not to go down this route. Third, it’s incredibly expensive, and other governments appear to prefer using diesel-electric icebreakers.

• The total traffic volume on the Northern Sea Route has been steadily growing; in 2022, it reached an estimated 34,034 million tonnes, in comparison with 20,180 million tonnes in 2018. One of the places that may benefit from this? Murmansk. It’s the largest Arctic shipping hub, strategically positioned on the Kola Peninsula along the Barents Sea. As a non-freezing, deep-water port, it may become even busier as the ice retreats for longer periods every year.

• It is estimated that 45% of current Russian economic activity has ties to the black and grey economies. Note that the footnote for this information was from a January 2020 report. I remain slightly sceptical of that figure.

• Over the next few decades, the impact of permafrost melt on Russia’s infrastructure is likely to worsen

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Central Asia

• The total population is expected to grow from 81 million in 2022 to around 108 million in 2055, with Uzbekistan being the region’s most populous country

• Central Asia depends on its two major rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, for approximately 90% of its fresh water. Approximately 50% of river water in the region originates from glacial melt. The Amu Darya’s water availability is projected to decline by 40% over the next three decades, potentially reducing crop yields by 30%

• Out to 2055, India will also look increasingly to the region for access to resources such as uranium. South Korea, Japan and India may potentially cooperate more closely with each other to boost their weight in the competition with China

• The establishment of special economic zones that are attracting high-skilled young Russians moving their businesses out of Russia has created a new economic dynamic

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Southwest Asia and the South Caucasus

• The region was home to over 386 million people in 2022, and this number is forecast to rise to approximately 535 million by 2055. Syria, Iraq and Yemen are expected to grow by more than 50% by 2055, Iraq’s population is predicted to overtake that of Iran in 2071, and Georgia, Armenia, Qatar, Kuwait and Lebanon are shrinking

• Almost 90% of the region’s population growth will take place in cities. In Kuwait, an estimated 99% of the population already live in urban areas, whereas in Yemen the urban population represents only 39% of the country’s total

• Average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2019 was US $26,764; however, this masks significant differences between countries, with Qatar (US $94,028) and the UAE (US $70,089), for example, contrasting starkly with Yemen (US $3,689)

• The region possesses approximately 55% of the world’s proven crude oil resources and approaching half of its gas reserves, of which Iran holds around 26% and Qatar 18%

• In the UAE, expatriates accounted for 88.5% of its population in 2024

• Religious affiliation in the region is predominantly Islam at 92.2% of the population, followed by Christianity (4.3%) and Judaism (1.8%). As noted earlier, some back of the packet maths would imply that there are almost more Muslims in India than there are across this region combined, which is an interesting dynamic rarely covered in mainstream coverage.

• A fifth of people in Yemen live below the poverty line. In 2020, there were approximately 15 million out-of-school children in Southwest Asia and North Africa, a figure that is projected to rise to 20 million by 2030. 6 Iraq, Syria and Yemen are thought to account for nearly two thirds of this figure. Note that this data is old (pre-Covid, pre Syrian coup, pre latest situation in Yemen. Suspect it is even higher than the figure and projections discussed above. Significant human capital going to waste.)

• While the burden of communicable diseases is decreasing, however, non‑communicable diseases accounted for 74% of all deaths in the region in 2018. NCDs are diseases that are not directly caused by infectious agents (like bacteria or viruses). I found this stat to be very odd, so had a dig into the footnote cited here, which focuses on Syrian refugees living in neighbouring countries like Lebanon and Jordan in 2018. The most common NCDs included hypertension, chronic respiratory diseases, diabetes, arthritis and cardiovascular disease. Hypertension prevalence among Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon was estimated at 9.7 and 7.4%, respectively; diabetes prevalence was 5.3 and 3.3%, respectively; and chronic respiratory disease prevalence was 3.1 and 3.8%, respectively. I’m not sure what it would be like now.

• At present, eight of the top ten most water-stressed countries in the world are located in the region. The majority of countries currently import more than 50% of their cereals. Two interesting chokepoints: water and grain.

• Internet connectivity has already grown significantly in the region, from 32% of the population in 2011 to 77% in 2021

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Africa

• By 2040, Africa’s use of hydropower could almost quadruple (aided by projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) and the use of solar power increase a hundred-fold, taking their shares of total electricity generation to around 19% each. Ethiopia inaugurated that dam recently, and it seems to be causing friction with neighbouring Egypt and to a lesser extent Sudan, both of which fear their water access will be hit.

• On current trends, Africa’s population is projected to double to almost 2.65 billion by 2055. Over the next 30 years, approximately half to two-thirds of world population growth will take place in Africa, meaning that by the middle of the century over a quarter of the world’s population will be African. I am sceptical of much of the population counting done across Africa based on various anecdotal tales and some research, but this seems as good a bet as any. OECD adds “Over the next three decades, Africa’s urban population will double, increasing from 700 million to 1.4 billion by 2050, making it the continent with the second largest urban population after Asia.”

• In 2055, the median age of an African citizen is predicted to be 25.0 years, in comparison with 47.5 years in Europe and 51.9 years in East Asia. Per this report, the current median age is 19.7 years, meaning Africa is home to the world’s youngest population

• There are 38 African countries that are coastal states and the continent has more than 48,000 kilometres of coastline and 13 million square kilometres of exclusive economic zones.

• The African Union estimates the current value of the African blue economy to be US $296 billion, and responsible for 49 million jobs; this could reach US $405 billion and 57 million jobs by 2030

• It is estimated that African economies lose US $88.6 billion (3.7% of GDP) annually in illicit financial flows, in comparison with overseas development assistance and foreign direct investment receipts of US $48 billion and US $54 billion respectively

• In 2023, more than 50,000 troops were deployed on United Nations (UN) operations in Africa, with tens of thousands more taking part in regionally led missions; approximately half of the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions operating around the world are in Africa

• Africa’s citizens have some of the lowest levels of access to basic services worldwide; in 2022, only 31% of the continent had access to safely managed sanitation facilities. There are currently approximately 600 million people living without electricity in Africa, representing almost 50% of the total population. Only 36% of the population had access to broadband Internet in 2022

• In 2022, the World Health Organization estimated that 24 million African adults suffered from diabetes, with this figure projected to rise by 129% to 55 million by 2045. Dipped into the source for this one, which adds “In the African region, premature deaths from diabetes (defined as deaths occurring before the age of 70) stands at 58%, higher than the global average of 48%.

• Whilst Christianity is likely to remain the dominant religion in the near to medium term, the proportion of the population following the Islamic faith will increase, largely due to higher birth rates. By 2060, it is estimated that over a quarter of the world’s Muslim population will live in sub-Saharan Africa, with that region’s Muslim population surpassing that of North Africa and Southwest Asia by 2040. This source comes from a 2017 Pew Research analysis, which also notes that by 2060, a plurality of Christians – more than four-in-ten – will call sub-Saharan Africa home, up from 26% in 2015. However, if we look at more recent Pew data, it seems to be the case that many young people in African countries are less religious than the generations before them. I couldn’t work out if this was both Islam and Christianity combined - my gut, backed up by more Pew data on the growth of Islam between 2010 and 2020 - is that it is less clear. Furthermore, Pew Research looking at the religion of the world’s migrants found Christians made up a the highest percent, at 47%, over Muslims, at 29%. From a geopolitical and geostrategic point of view, I’m driven by this question because I remain convinced the chance of a new religion or strand of religion appearing in the coming decades is overlooked, especially if it’s enabled by AI.

• The informal economy continues to dominate in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, being responsible for 38% of GDP in the region (in comparison with 16% in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries) and 86% of all employment

• In 2000, France was the top trading partner for 15 African countries, the US for six, the UK for five and China for only two; by 2020, this had switched to China being the top trading partner for 29, the United Arab Emirates for six and France for only three, with the US and the UK no longer the top trading partner for a single African country. Visualised above. Not looking good on the UK side, given over that period the UK engaged in several ‘Africa Strategy’ resets. Separately, a Brookings report I read some months ago from January 2025 included a long section on Chinese companies’ post-Covid19 focus on critical minerals across the continent. It noted “during the 2024 China International Mining Conference, experts discussed new opportunities in Madagascar, Guinea, and Mozambique, where mineral resources including graphite, titanium, nickel, cobalt, and tin reserves are relatively underdeveloped and untapped.” Elsewhere the Brookings report notes “Africa possesses approximately 30% of the world’s known mineral reserves such as gold, cobalt, and diamonds. Additionally, African-sourced materials are critical for transition to a low carbon economy—60% of the world’s production of Manganese, ~70% of Cobalt, and 70% of Iridium occurs on the continent.”

• Africa is also responsible for 18% of global uranium production, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo currently produces over two-thirds of the world’s cobalt, and South Africa over 70% of the world’s platinum

• Chinese and Russian firms have forged agreements to develop nuclear energy capability in several African countries, including Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Uganda and Sudan. A really interesting statistic. I know very little about nuclear but recalled reading somewhere that France and South Korea are somewhat important players in this picture. If that’s the case, why aren’t they represented in this section? I hadn’t even considered China. What’s their market penetration been like? So I used ChatGPT’s research function and had a rudimental dig. Table below, with above caveat that this is rudimental.

• Africa remaining the continent with the highest number of state-based conflicts in 2022, a position it has held for several years, and recording the highest number of battle‑related deaths. Total African military expenditure increased by 17% in the decade to 2019, with expenditure in North Africa increasing by 67%

• Of the top 20 countries most severely impacted by terrorist activity in 2022, ten were in Africa, with 60% of all global deaths from terrorism taking place in sub-Saharan Africa

• 2021 saw more military coups in Africa than any other year in the previous two decades, and further coups taking place in Burkina Faso, Gabon and Niger since then

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Europe

• Europe’s economic growth has been relatively low since the 1990s and this trend is likely to continue, driven by ageing populations and lagging technological innovation in some sectors compared with the US and some other countries. Projections indicate that the EU’s share of global gross domestic product (GDP) may fall from 18.3% in 2019 to 11.3% in 2050, which would make it a smaller economy than India at 12.8%. This and the demographic issues obviously lead to questions on immigration, which the report does explore with careful wording. The reality appears to be that very few European nations have a coherent strategy for marrying the need for more workers with the realities of increasing migration into their nations, which is almost always unpopular. Human beings are not economic units - they have their own cultures, incentives, drivers and views: a point so often missed by economists and policymakers. Evidence shows demagogue / far-right governments tend to trade short-term political wins for long-run economic losses. But to counter this, have European populations just grown weary of the endless promise of higher immigration in return for economic growth that’s failed to materialise? Do these potential ‘long-run economic losses’ matter at all to populations who feel like they are ALREADY in a long-run losing spree? Hard to know, even harder to advise on.

• Europe will start experiencing a population decline from the 2030s; eastern and southern Europe are already in decline, western Europe will enter a decline in the late 2030s and the population of northern Europe will plateau in the 2050s. The EU is projected to have 17 million fewer people of working age by 2040 than in 2023. This comes from the recent European Commission 2025 Strategic Foresight Report.

• In 2021, the average life expectancy in Europe was 78.3 years, with large differences between countries. For example, in Moldova the life expectancy was less than 70 years, compared with 84 years in Switzerland. By 2055, rates are likely to have converged and risen to an average of 84 years

• 42% of young Europeans rely primarily on TikTok, Instagram, or YouTube for news. From the European Commission 2025 Strategic Foresight Report. I had a look at Reuters’ most recent analysis to learn more. Interestingly, it notes that Europeans as a whole seem to use it less than their American peers for news. A second interesting note: Americans listen to podcasts more than Europeans, and many northern European podcast markets remain dominated by public broadcasters or big legacy media companies. My pet theory here is that Americans spend more time driving to and from work that they listen to podcasts more than Europeans, AND that podcasts play more of a role across American-led social media conversation than any European counterpart has [based in London, I’ve seen more Joe Rogan clips than all other non-US podcast hosts combined.]

• Europe accounts for more than one third of the top 100 universities, although the US has many more than Europe among the top 25. The EU accounts for almost 20% of the world’s total research and development.

• Between 2016 and 2020 countries in the EU accounted for the majority of granted patents for space-related technologies. I was sceptical of this so had a look at the OECD footnote report provided by DCDC. I think they’ve got it wrong: my read suggests the OECD notes the EU is a major player but not the majority holder of space-related patent families in 2016–20, and post-2020 data points to continued U.S. strength and a pronounced rise by China, with Europe competitive in some niches (e.g., propulsion) but not dominant overall. The report also notes “Given such modest historical growth rates, it is hard to believe that the sector will become a “1 trillion economy” by 2040, as previously estimated by several investment banks.”

• The EU’s energy dependency was 62.5% in 2022. 58.4% for 2023, per recent European Commission stats, which is still higher than I would have guessed. Broken down further: Petroleum oils (crude & refined) - United States 16.1%, Norway 13.5%, Kazakhstan 11.5%. Natural gas (pipeline), 2024: Norway 45.6%, Algeria 19.3%, Russia 16.6%. Coal, latest available Q1 2025: Australia 33.4%, United States 31.3%, Colombia 16.0%.

• Europe is dependent on imports of many critical materials from non‑European states (including China, Kazakhstan, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Brazil and Chile). Cost issues and the reality that China straddles processing and mid-stream in the supply chain, plus European projects are slow due to permitting, local opposition, energy costs and financing. For example, Portugal has lithium deposits that are untapped. In March this year, the European Commission published a list of 47 strategic projects located in 13 European Union member states: Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Czechia, Greece, Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Poland and Romania: 25 involve extraction, 24 processing and 10 recycling, with some a combination of these features. That being said, the EU is reliant on the following for materials: Ferro-niobium: ~84% Brazil · Borates: ~98–99% Turkey · Magnesium: ~96–97% China · Rare earths: China ≈46% by weight (2024) · Cobalt (mined): DRC ≈74% global · Bauxite: Guinea dominant · Lithium: large EU share from Chile · Uranium: >90% from Canada/Kazakhstan/Russia/Niger (2023)

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Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)

• This region is home to over 662 million people, or roughly 8.2% of the global population. An estimated 40 million LAC citizens live outside their countries of origin, equivalent to 15% of the world’s migrant population

• Whilst geographically vast, LAC has the second highest urban population, many of whom live in the region’s six highly populous megacities of Bogota (Colombia), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Lima (Peru), Mexico City (Mexico), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and São Paulo (Brazil)

• Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, around 12 million children and adolescents were already outside the education system, but the pandemic highlighted this divide further as well as the region’s digital divide (an estimated 43% of primary schools and 62% of secondary schools lack access to the Internet)

• Across Latin America, 47% of indigenous people and 26% of Afro-descendants live in poverty, compared with just 16% of those of European and other descent. Although home to just 8% of the global population, LAC accounted for 33% of the world’s homicides in 2018. Most up to date figure puts this at ~29% of the world’s homicides. 41% of total homicide victims are aged 17 to 30 across countries in LAC, 87% of total victims are men. Just five countries – Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico, India and South Africa – accounted for 40% of all homicides worldwide. The top 10 countries recorded over 53% of all global homicides

• In 2020, health care spending accounted for just 3.8% of GDP, a figure significantly lower than the OECD average of 6.6%. On average, the region has only two doctors per 1,000 members of the population, a figure below the OECD average of 3.5, with only Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago above the OECD average; in contrast, Haiti, Honduras and Guatemala have the lowest ratios, at or below 0.3 doctors per 1,000. 2023 update via OECD: LAC, public health outlays in the region averaged ~4% of GDP (2019) versus ~6.6% in the OECD; total health spending was 6.9% versus 8.5%. LAC has about 2.0 doctors per 1,000 with only Cuba, Uruguay, Trinidad & Tobago and Argentina above the OECD level; Haiti is the only country at ≤0.3 per 1,000.

• LAC supplies 20% of the world’s agricultural products. Agriculture will remain important for the region’s economies, accounting for 5–18% of GDP in 20 LAC countries

• Commodity exports are central to most of LAC’s economies. Peru and Chile are the world’s two largest copper producers and Brazil is home to 17% of all nickel reserves

• Following the COVID-19 pandemic, LAC has one of the largest debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratios and highest levels of inequality in the world

• Venture capital investment injected US $15.7 billion into the region in 2021, exceeding the combined total for investment into Southeast Asia, Africa and Southwest Asia

• Almost 80% of the region’s GDP growth over the past 15 years has resulted from growing populations rather than rising productivity; between 2000 and 2015, for example, employment grew at an annual rate of 2.3%, but productivity growth was only 0.6%

• It is estimated that 35 million people in LAC suffer from drug use disorders, with 585,000 deaths annually. This is from a 2020 OECD estimate, but the link no longer exists. It also appears to be incorrect. United Nations quotes the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017 which “estimated that, globally, in 2017, there were 585,000 deaths.” On the topic of drug use and spread, I was mildy interested by how little attention or spread Captagon seemed to get outside of MENA. This drug was basically monopolised (80% of all trade) by the Syrian state under Assad, turning his country into a narco-state. But it’s incredibly cheap, spread throughout the region (penetration into Saudi market was upwards of 90% if I recall correctly), and yet never seemed to make its way to South America or Europe. My guess is LAC already has cheap narcotics, and the routes to trade it are very localised to MENA.

• São Paulo is the biggest megacity and an emerging economic powerhouse for Latin America, possessing a GDP higher than that of Argentina. The city has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, being home to 30,000 millionaires (approximately one for every 100 of the city’s poor). The Argentina comparison seemed off, even when compared to pre-Milei. I think the quote above conflates São Paulo city with state, and even then, that would be an inaccurate comparison.

• Of the 33 South American states, 21 have now joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative, resulting in substantial investment in dams, ports, railways and other infrastructure. China and Latin America’s bilateral trade increasing from US $18 billion in 2002 to US $450 billion in 2021, with estimates suggesting that this is on course to exceed US $700 billion by 2035

• Russia’s diplomatic influence is growing, and trade with the region increased by 44% to US $12 billion between 2006 and 2016. BRICS being an obvious example of growing efforts to influence.

• LAC received US $224 billion in foreign direct investment in 2022, a record high and 55% higher than in 2021. The countries that received the highest inflows were Brazil (33% of the total), Mexico (23%), Chile (11%), Colombia (7%), Peru (5%) and Argentina (5%). The US and the European Union (excluding the Netherlands and Luxembourg) were the region’s main investors in 2022, representing 38% and 17% of the total respectively

• There are 2.3 million people working in LAC’s fishing sector, which generates more than 11 million tonnes of produce per year. The growth of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing poses an increasing threat to local livelihoods, as well as to coastal ecosystems and fish stocks. While in the Caribbean illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is mainly perpetrated by small-scale fishers from within the region, more sizeable national fleets operate elsewhere, with large Chinese fleets responsible for significant illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing along Latin America’s Pacific coast. These vessels operate in Latin America’s oceans throughout the year, and the number of Chinese‑flagged vessels in the region continues to grow annually. I’ve written about illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing extensively, so won’t rehash my arguments here. But my view remains that this is one of the most overlooked issues that may spark conflict between nations. Beyond the actual catch itself, the act of IUU removes financial benefit for countries. Peru serves as a strong example of this: ODI estimates that the direct boost from catching is modest (≈ US $12.4m), but the indirect ripple through processing, transport and services is large (≈ US $229.3m). This pattern is replicated throughout several countries, including Senegal, Ghana, Ecuador and the Philippines. Some of these nations look to protect their EEZs, but many suffer from lax laws and poor enforcement.

• Although 71% of urban citizens have access to the Internet, coverage in rural areas is significantly worse, with only 37% having access. Given these challenges, many regional countries have turned to China to provide digital infrastructure, including telecommunications, big data analytics, cloud computing and smart city technology

• Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Uruguay and Bolivia have national space agencies, with Argentina and Brazil also having space launch sites. At present, 11 regional states own or operate satellites, a number which is likely to increase further. While many states rely on the US, Russia or Europe for technical expertise, equipment and joint partnerships, Mexico and Argentina formed the Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency in 2020; Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Paraguay have joined since, with Colombia and Peru as observers

• More than 60% of the region’s roads still unpaved, despite the fact that over 85% of freight is transported via this means

• Similarly, LAC is home to a limited rail network, with passenger railways moving only 38 million passengers per kilometre, a figure significantly below the global average of 484 million passengers per kilometre

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North America

• The population of Northern America will grow by over 45 million over the next 30 years, not peaking until well after 2055

• Approximately half the population will be of working age and around a quarter over retirement age, with Canada having the largest proportion of retirement age individuals in the region. By 2036, the ratio in Canada could be fewer than three workers for every person aged over 65

• On average, the life expectancy of the region is expected to continue to increase, with median estimates suggesting a rise of 5–10 years to around 84 years in 2055

• In the US, the number of individuals aged 50 or older with at least one chronic condition is projected to increase by 99.5%, from 71.522 million in 2020 to 142.66 million by the middle of the century

• In the US, the non-Hispanic white population of the US is expected to drop below 50% within the next three decades

• Due to extensive inward migration, approximately 50% of the Canadian population is expected to be either foreign born or the offspring of foreign-born parents by 2040; at the same time, the indigenous population of Canada is likely to double

• Out to 2055, sea ice melt will see new Arctic shipping routes being opened and may enable access to previously untapped natural resources. Overlapping territorial claims on the part of Russia, Canada and Denmark/Greenland will fuel tensions over control of the Northern Sea Route, which could offer a shorter shipping route between Asia, Northern America and Europe, potentially reducing transport costs and boosting trade

• Automation is likely to increase across all sectors, growing by nearly 40% in the US and Canada by the 2030s and potentially seeing an exponential rise by 2055

• In Greenland, agriculture accounted for approximately 18% of GDP in 2022

• As a percentage of each country’s GDP, 93% of Bermuda’s economy, 70% of Canada’s economy, 78% of the US economy and 63% of Greenland’s economy was generated by the service sector in 2022

• At present, 76% of Canada’s total exports are to the US and 18% from the US to Canada, highlighting Canada’s dependence on trade with its southern neighbour, as reinforced by the USMCA trade agreement. This is still roughly the same as when the report was written, despite trade and rhetoric challenges.

• Building sea walls for storm surge protection for coastal cities with more than 25,000 residents will require at least US $42 billion; if this were to be expanded to communities under 25,000 people, the cost would increase to US $400 billion

• One third of the Canadian coastline is moderately or highly sensitive to sea level rise, including 80% of the Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island coasts. The annual cost of flooding to dwellings due to baseline risks and climate change could be between US $4 billion and US $17 billion by the middle of the century

• Canada, while not at the scale of the US, nevertheless benefits from a technology sector worth approximately US $120 billion, employing nearly 7% of its labour force

• Competition between the US and China will extend into space and onto the Moon, particularly as China seeks to establish a permanent presence on the Moon and Mars. In 2021, China and Russia signed an MoU to build a moon base. The rough timeline is in three phases: reconnaissance (2021–25), construction (2026–35), then utilisation (from 2036). China launched its Queqiao-2 relay satellite (supports south-pole/far-side missions) early in Spring last year. A couple of months ago, Chinese state media announced its first Mars sample-return mission, Tianwen-3, is scheduled for launch around 2028, with the goal of returning no less than 500 grams of Martian samples to Earth by around 2031, according to the mission's chief scientist.

CONCLUDING VIEWS

This is not an effort to deep dive into every point, fact or statistic pulled from DCDC’s report. It’s a collection effort, a chance to put data points together that may allow you to find links you otherwise might not have spotted. Perhaps something in here jolts a long dormant thought in your head, or clinches a view you’ve held for years.

I hope you enjoyed it. I’m extremely grateful to the DCDC team who put this together and put it in the public domain.