It's time for FISH, INC.
Why Britain can once more be the captain of the (under)seas
These essays are meant to be provocative, and based on both a red team principle and my love of the Oyster Club. It is my aim to stress test Westminster concepts, learn from the feedback I receive, and introduce new ideas occasionally. I try and write them in a conversational manner.
I am a firm believer in putting pen to paper, or fingers to touchpad, as a means of refining thinking. I will certainly get things wrong, but that's how I learn. I do not have all the answers for the questions I pose in my writing.
These views are mine and mine only: they do not represent my employers.
Hello,
I’ve been mulling illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. It’s a multi-billion-dollar geoeconomic, geopolitical, and climate threat, yet current enforcement tools are expensive, inconsistent, and often ineffective.
This essay proposes FISH, INC., a hypothetical British-backed fleet of autonomous submarines leased to vulnerable nations as a low-cost, high-tech enforcement-as-a-service solution. I’m going to argue that with power dividends, Commonwealth reach, and a strategic fit under AUKUS Pillar II and the MoD’s new turn to innovation, the UK should consider taking an active interest.
First, let’s set the scene.
In 2022, around 91 million tonnes of fish were captured from the world’s oceans. One in five, roughly 18 million tonnes [or the equivalent weight of three million male African elephants] were caught illegaly.
The value of this black market sits between $10 and $23.5 billion per year, the entire national output of 7–12 African countries, depending on which end of the estimate you take.
It seems to particularly impact poorer countries, who also lack the resources to tackle the issue fully.
Distant water fishing (DWF) is a major vector. These are fleets operating far from their home nations, often in weakly governed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZs). Ownership is typically obscured through shell companies.
The top five nations with flag registrations, per a 2024 Congress report, are China (38%), Taiwan (22%), Japan (10%), South Korea (10%), and Spain (10%). They account for 90% of all DWF and primarily operate in the Indo-Pacific region and off the coasts of East and West Africa and South America. Chinese vessels are particularly egregious rule breakers.
Countries have attempted to take action, including the first binding international agreement to target IUU fishing, called the Port State Measures Agreement (to track what’s arriving into various ports) and other initiatives, such as Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. RFMOs exist to track stock which migrates, such as tuna, but vary in terms of rules and enforcement.
This is a geoeconomic and development issue: in West Africa, for instance, estimated catches are up to 40% higher than official figures. In South America, Peru has passed laws allowing lethal force against IUU, following the decimation of its squid population. Argentina now regularly patrols “milla 200”, a 550 or so fleet that sits just outside its EEZ, as seen in the video below. Many of these countries have economies that rely extensively on fishing. This is a geopolitical issue: in the South China Sea, IUU risks causing a hot war as countries seek to protect their fishing boundaries (note, for example, Chinese state media blaming the Philippines for IUU environmental damage). Argentina’s Navy, under the Joint Maritime Command of the Armed Forces’ Joint Chiefs of Staff, launched Operation Mare Nostrum I to patrol its EEZ in February 2025. President Donald Trump has already issued an EO on IUU and expanding US fishing distance, alongside a Daily Mail opinion piece by influential adviser (and tariff advocate) Peter Navarro.
This is a climate issue: warming weather patterns will probably cause further issues, as fish change their migratory patterns to follow warmer/saltier/colder ocean currents. New theatres will open, including the Arctic Circle, where countries will push for access (already a point of tension). This is a societal issue: the nature of IUU means fleets of fisherman are often working in conditions similar to those we would observe and classify as modern slavery. An Economist profile of IUU from 2024 noted “Things are…bleaker for the non-Chinese crew members who staff China’s distant-water fleet. On one vessel eight Mozambican workers had to sleep in just two beds. On another there was no working toilet for the Filipino and Indonesian crew, who had to defecate off the side of the boat for an entire months-long voyage. Anyone who complained would be kicked, beaten or threatened with salary deductions. Crew members interviewed by the EJF said four of their comrades had died at sea, one of them by suicide.”
And this is an opportunity: There are international efforts underway to tackle IUU. Countries from across the spectrum realise the impact it could have on their populations (and many approach it from a position of protecting the national interest, even if they use words to the effects of “this is the right thing to do”.
So, how do nations currently try and tackle IUU?
Many countries utilise their navies, airforce (see Argentina’s in action below) or coastguard to try and find and stop IUU in action. In some cases, this can get violent: recent incidents have included Argentina opening fire on an IUU vessel.
Additionally, smaller nations cannot always afford to create and maintain the capacity needed to guard their EEZs. In this case, other nations have offered help:
USA: The US Coast Guard’s Shiprider agreements enabled patrols with nations like Ghana, Seychelles, and Pacific Island nations such as the Marshall Islands, which allows US personnel to operate under host nation law.
Australia: conducts regional patrols through Operation Solania and the Pacific Maritime Security Program.
New Zealand: Part of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), where it funds and operates Operation Tui Moana.
Japan: offers grant aid for surveillance equipment and boats under the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
Britain: HMS Trent (River-class OPV) has conducted anti-IUU patrols off West Africa under Operation Obangame Express in 2022–23, including in the EEZs of Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria. Additionally, the Foreign Office provides £20 million+ to support surveillance and enforcement around 4 million km² of ocean territory belonging to UK Overseas Territories.
CASE STUDY - HMS TAMAR AND IUU
In early 2024, Britain’s HMS Tamar collaborated with the Fijian Ministry of Fisheries and the Royal New Zealand Navy's Deployable Boarding Team to patrol Fiji's vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which spans approximately 1.29 million square kms. They intercepted and boarded 23 vessels.
However, Tamar (like other manned vessels) has limitations. It must account for supplies, days at sea, crew fatigue, and maintenance needs. As a Batch 2 River-class offshore patrol vessel, HMS Tamar has an operational endurance of approximately 35 days and a range exceeding 6,000 nautical miles. But extended deployments in the expansive Pacific Ocean present logistical challenges, particularly in regions lacking established UK support infrastructure.
What is lacking is an enforcer with the sole aim of destroying IUU…
Enter FISH, INC.
The concept I’ve mulled over appears charmingly simple. Create a fleet of autonomous small submarines, which patrol EEZs with satellites relaying data above. Lease these submarines to countries or blocs as a means of helping them protect their EEZs - security as a service. When the vessel comes into contact with an IUU, they immobilise it (with the legal cover of the leasing nation), and send a signal to the local coastguard to retrieve it.
Here are some small observations from my research:
Here are some notes I’ve penned (beyond my lack of engineering prowess):
My original plan was for the submarines - which I think I prefer to small underwater drones - to use a local electro magnetic pulse (EMP) to disable the IUU vessel. This runs contra to international legislation apparently (more on that later). Additionally, EMPs are limited in their scope by salt water.
If the aim is so immobilise, other tools are avaliable. FISH, INC., could consider a model where it ‘darts’ the vessel’s propeller with an industrial strength net with balloons or something similar, potentially with satellite uplinks. As noted further up, some of these vessels will be crewed by people working under conditions equal to modern slavery. Loss of life should be avoided at all costs.
This could feed into multi-tier deterrence: (1) observation + evidence logging; (2) soft physical deterrence; (3) alert & coordinate with host nation coastguards.
A huge amount of open-source data exists on different fleets and vessels. FISH, INC., could incorporate and build on huge reams of data which is currently open source
I’m fond of the US Navy’s Sea Hunter, its unmanned surface vehicle. But I don’t think it would do the job here. Anduril’s Dive-LD is my favourite so far.
I’m not immune to concerns around the potential to spark geopolitical conflicts. On this front, two things have cemented my view that these risks could be minimised. First, defending EEZs, which countries are entitled to do under UNCLOS, comes with a series of escalatory measures a country (or company contracted by that country) can use. There’s precedent here which is widely understood. Second, China recently joined the PSMA, an explicit acknlowedgment that IUU is a major issue.
Here’s a rough idea of a business model:
Product:
Initial fleet of 20 small, semi-autonomous underwater submarines designed for persistent surveillance, tracking, and interdiction in a target nation's EEZ. Equipped with: High-endurance battery + AI navigation, satellite uplink + machine learning-based IUU detection, and passive deterrence tools (e.g., propeller netting, tagging, sonar alarms.)
Leasing Model
Annual or seasonal leases to national governments or regional blocs. Charge ~25% of their current IUU enforcement spend (navy, coastguard, aircraft fuel/logistics, and so on.) Include tiered pricing based on the size of the EEZ, the number of subs deployed, and integration with existing systems. The British Government could choose to divert ODA into this priject for select countries, effectively subsidising FISH, INC. for smaller nations and winning influence in return.
Example: If Ghana currently spends $20m/yr on patrols, FISH, INC. charges $5m to cover 6 months of tuna season. They lease 3 subs, integrated with local Navy.
Additionally: FISH, INC. could sell marine domain awareness (MDA) packages—heatmaps of vessel density, IUU probability zones, ship pattern analysis. Clients: governments, NGOs, marine insurers, fisheries agencies, hedge funds (commodity forecasting), and climate researchers. It could use same sensor payload and AI to extract this data passively.
CapEx (I’ve made up these numbers for this section)
Initial fleet build: £1.5–3 million per sub depending on complexity and endurance.
Low-end (£1.5m): persistent surveillance, basic AI, no deterrence
High-end (£3m): deterrence tools, live video uplink, better stealth
Total fleet (20 subs): £30–50 million
OpEx (Annual per sub):
Maintenance + refit cycles: £100–200k
Satellite bandwidth & AI model hosting: £50k
Field service support (shared regional teams): £100k
Insurance, compliance, legal: £30k
Per-sub annual OpEx: ~£250–400k
Break-even: 3–4 leases per year per sub depending on pricing.
Why the British Government should back FISH, INC.
Let’s say FISH, INC. manages to spawn into existence. Why should the British Government take a strong interest?
Here, my view is threefold:
Britain could rightfully claim to be at the cutting edge of tackling IUU, and could lease these vessels to friendly nations, Indo-Pacific partners, and potentially include FISH, INC. in trade deals and partnerships with blocs. Britain leads the Commonwealth, and around 30 Commonwealth countries have maritime economies highly exposed to IUU. This isn’t just soft power, it’s strategic infrastructure. As the blue economy expands and climate instability shifts fish stocks into new contested areas, countries that can see, understand, and enforce their maritime rights will dominate the next phase of geoeconomic competition. One potential option could be for British International Investment (BII) to take a minority shareholding.
This fits (loosely) under AUKUS Pillar II, the triumvirate partnership between the US, UK and Australia. This Pillar covers artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles and quantum technologies and is focusing on “accelerating adoption, and improving the resilience of, autonomous and AI-enabled systems in contested environments.” The Ministry of Defence is also gearing through some innovation changes.
To get around UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) banning the use of certain powers, FISH, INC. would need to be directly contracted by the states leasing the vessels to protect their EEZ. British Government support may help expedite this process.
Concluding views
Imagine a world in which IUU is down 50% in a decade, and Britain - the once great naval nation - could claim to be the driving power behind it.
THAT is power.
Britain cannot outspend the US or out scale China: but it can out-think both. FISH, INC. is not just a thought experiment; it’s a prototype for the kind of asymmetric, tech-enabled foreign policy the UK should pursue. It fuses AI, autonomous systems, and maritime strategy into a deployable capability that advances climate goals, deters grey-zone activity, and reinforces Britain’s role as a force multiplier for small states.
This is statecraft on a startup budget. It turns aid into influence, defence into deterrence, and innovation into infrastructure. It is also a test: can Britain still be first to do something bold, useful, and globally relevant?
In the fight against IUU, we can’t rely on a navy of the past - but we can build a network for the future.
Let’s build it.
That's brillant
Very interesting, let’s hope someone picks it up. However, given that at least two the offending nations are pretty teched-up you might consider that some counter measures are likely. You may need to build in loss of machines as a result.